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PREEMPTION-THE PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF THE
AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT AS AMENDED BY THE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM:
WRIGHT V. NORDAM GROUP, INC.
KATRINA MAHER*

N WRGHT V. NORDAM Group, Inc.,' the U.S. District Court
.for the Northern District of Oklahoma erred in holding that
all state law whistleblower claims based on retaliation for raising
safety concerns in the airline industry were completely preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), as amended by
the Whistleblower Protection Program (WPP).2 By disregarding
customary principles of interpretation of legislative intent, the
district court has misinterpreted the purpose of the WPP and
thereby denied many airline employees their right to redress
under state law whistleblower protections.
In 1978, Congress enacted the ADA in an effort to encourage
the utmost "reliance on competitive market forces" in the airline industry. To ensure that states could not interfere in the
deregulation of the airline industry, Congress included within
the ADA an express preemption provision in § 41713, specifically prohibiting states from enforcing any law "related to a
price, route, or service" of any airline. 4 The Supreme Court has
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.A. Broadcast Journalism and Spanish 2006, summa cum laude, University of
North Texas. The author would like to thank her parents for their continued
love and support.
I No. 07-CV-0699-CVE-PJC, 2008 WL 802986 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2008).
2 Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2000).
3 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
4 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). This broadly-phrased express preemption provision has created a significant amount of litigation since its enactment. See generally Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of § 105 Airline
Deregulation Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 41713), Pertaining to Preemption of Authority over
Prices, Routes, and Services, 149 A.L.R. FED. 299 (1998) (discussing the ways courts
have handled issues of ADA preemption regarding various state law causes of
action).
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given § 41713 broad preemptive force; 5 yet, the Supreme Court
has also cautioned that the ADA's preemptive scope is not
boundless and does not preempt state law claims that are "too
tenuous[ly]" related to the services of an airline.6 Thus, for the
first twenty-two years following passage of the ADA, if a state law
whistleblower claim was not related to the services of an airline,
the claim was not expressly preempted by § 41713. 7 However,
when Congress enacted the WPP and created a federal
whistleblower cause of action,8 the courts were forced to address
the issue of whether Congress intended to expand the preemptive scope of § 41713 such that all state law whistleblower claims
falling within the WPP's scope are preempted.' In Wright, the
district court was confronted with this critical issue.
Keith L. Wright was an employee of NORDAM Group, Inc.' 0
On September 19, 2007, Wright was terminated for allegedly refusing to "alter or indorse documentation of an unauthorized
unapproved repair on a military aircraft."" After his termination, Wright filed a complaint against NORDAM in the Tulsa
County District Court alleging, among other things, wrongful
termination under Oklahoma state law.' 2 NORDAM removed
the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of

5 Wright, 2008 WL 802986, at *2; see also Morales, 504 U.S. at 384.
6

Morales, 504 U.S. at 390

7 For example, in Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that

a state law retaliatory discharge claim alleging that American Airlines terminated
the plaintiff for filing a worker's compensation suit was not preempted by
§ 41713 because the state law claim was too tenuously related to the services of
American Airlines. Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 594 (5th Cir.
1993).
8 The WPP provides, in relevant part, as follows:
No air carrier ...may discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee ... (1)
provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide ... to the
employer or Federal Government information relating to any violation or alleged violation of any order, regulation, or standard of the
Federal Aviation Administration.
49 U.S.C. § 42121(a)(1).
9 See, e.g., Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1263-64 (11th Cir.
2003); Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488, 492-98 (8th Cir. 2002); Fadaie v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216-17 (W.D. Wash. 2003).
10 Wright, 2008 WL 802986, at *1.
I1 Id.
12

Id.
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Oklahoma on the grounds that Wright's wrongful termination

13
claim under state law was completely preempted by the WPP.

Upon removal of the case, Wright did not challenge
NORDAM's assertion that the WPP completely preempted his
state law wrongful discharge claim. 4 However, because the doctrine of complete preemption provided the grounds for the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court had an
independent obligation to review the basis of its subject matter
jurisdiction even if such jurisdiction was not in dispute.' 5 In addressing whether or not Wright's state law whistleblower suit was
completely preempted by the ADA, as amended by the WPP, the
district court applied the following two part analysis: (1) does
the ADA, as amended by the WPP, preempt the state law
whistleblower claim relied upon by Wright; and (2) did Congress intend to allow removal in such cases, as manifested by the
creation of a replacement cause of action? 6 This discussion will
only address the first prong of the test as it is the only prong
pertinent to the critical issue discussed above.
In addressing the first prong of the test, the district court did
not propound its own analysis of the preemptive scope of the
ADA, as amended by the WPP. 17 Rather, the court adopted the
holding in Turgeau v. NORDAM Group, Inc.,"8 which, in turn, unconditionally adopted the in-depth analysis provided by the
Eighth Circuit in Botz v. Omni Air International.19 In applying the
reasoning set forth in Botz, the district court found that Wright's
state law retaliatory discharge claim was completely preempted
13 Id. The complete preemption doctrine recognizes that the preemptive
scope of some federal statutes "is so powerful as to displace entirely" an area of
state law. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987). Thus,
any claim allegedly based on the preempted state law may be removed to federal
court on the premise that federal preemption makes the state law claim "necessarily federal in character." Id. at 67.
14 Wright, 2008 WL 802986, at *3 n.5.
15 Id. (citing Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044,
1048 (10th Cir. 2006)).
16 See Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1343 (10th Cir. 1996) (establishing the Tenth Circuit test for complete preemption).
17 Wright, 2008 WL 802986, at *3.
18 Id. (citing Turgeau v. NORDAM Group, Inc., No. 02-CV-965-H(M), slip op.
at 5-11 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 8, 2003)).
19 See Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488, 491-98 (8th Cir. 2002). It must be
noted that Turgeau provided little analysis of its own regarding the preemptive
scope of the ADA, as amended by the WPP. Turgeau, No. 02-CV-965-H(M), slip
op. at 7. Turgeau basically adopted the Eighth Circuit's analysis provided in Botz.
Id.
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by the ADA, as amended by the WPP, because his claim could
have been brought in federal court under the WPP.2 ° Consequently, the district court expanded the scope of § 41713 to expressly preempt all state law whistleblower claims falling within
the scope of the WPP. 2' The court stated that the exclusive
grounds for this holding was that it found the ruling in Turgeau
to be "well-reasoned. ' 22 Therefore, by extension it necessarily
follows that the court also found the Eighth Circuit's analysis of
the preemptive scope of the ADA, as amended by the WPP, to
be highly persuasive. Thus, this discussion will focus on the
Eighth Circuit's analysis in Botz.
In Botz, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the WPP preempts
all state law whistleblower claims falling within its scope.2 3 The
court's judgment was based on the following arguments: (1) in
enacting the WPP, Congress intended to create a uniform
means of resolving whistleblower claims falling within its
scope; 2 4 and (2) Congress "only" would have included an additional, express preemption clause in the WPP itself if Congress
had intended the WPP to not wield any preemptive force upon
state law whistleblower claims.2 5 The court first reasoned that
Congress furthered its objective in ensuring reliance on competitive market forces in the airline industry by creating a "single,
uniform standard" for addressing state law whistleblower
claims. 26 The court then rejected the argument that if Congress
had intended the WPP to preempt state law whistleblower
claims, it would have included an express preemption provision
in the WPP itself.27 Instead the Eighth Circuit determined that
such an argument "turns the proper logic on its head" because,
when it enacted the WPP, Congress was unquestionably aware
of: (1) the existence of § 41713; and (2) the Supreme Court's
previous interpretation of § 41713 to have a "broad application. '28 Accordingly, Congress would not have thought it necessary to include another express preemption provision in the
WPP itself.29 Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the WPP's

23

Wright, 2008 WL 802986, at *3.
Id.
Id.
Botz, 286 F.3d at 498.

24

Id. at 497.

25

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

20
21
22

26
27
28
29
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silence with regard to preemption indicates that Congress naturally expected the WPP to preempt all state law whistleblower
claims falling within its scope.3 0
The district court in Wright erred in adopting the reasoning as
set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Botz. The Eighth Circuit's reasoning is flawed because it: (1) ignored customary rules of interpretation;31 (2) based its arguments on purported congressional
knowledge that renders Congress's intent merely ambiguous
and reveals nothing of Congress's view of the scope of § 41713;32
and (3) read a mandatory, federal cause of action into the WPP
when the WPP actually contains only a permissive cause of
action. 3
First, the Eighth Circuit's argument that Congress intended to
preempt all state law whistleblower claims falling within the
scope of the WPP so as to create a single, uniform means of
resolving whistleblower claims is unfounded because it overlooks established principles of the interpretation of legislative
intent.3 4 As the Eleventh Circuit in Branche v. Airtran Airways,
Inc. recognized, the glaring gap in the Eighth Circuit's argument is that it ignores the presumption that it is usually improper to imply preemption from a statute's substantive
provisions when Congress has chosen to explicitly address the
issue of preemption in that statute. 5 When the Eighth Circuit
inferred that the mere enactment of the WPP demonstrated legislative intent to preempt all state law whistleblower claims, the
Eighth Circuit was necessarily implying preemption. 6 However,
such an implied preemption is not permissible because the ADA
30 Id.

31 Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2003).
32

Id. at 1263.

33 Fadaie v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (W.D. Wash.

2003).
34 See Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263-64.
35 See id. The Supreme Court established this presumption in stating:
When Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing
that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of
congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no
need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the
substantive provisions of the legislation.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (internal quotations
omitted). However, the Supreme Court has also noted that Cipollone is not an
ironclad rule. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289 (1995).
36 Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263.
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already has an express preemption provision in § 41713.17 Further, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized, it is possible to point to
a number of federal statutes that have parallel state
equivalents. 8 Thus, the creation of a federal cause of action
cannot be the sole grounds "to expand the scope of an express
pre-emption provision to encompass and pre-empt all
equivalent state remedies." 9
Second, the Eighth Circuit's argument that Congress would
only have included an express preemption provision in the WPP
if it had intended to limit the preemptive force of the WPP is
speculative in that the WPP's silence with regard to preemption
is "ambiguous" at best.4" Therefore, such silence should not
serve as a basis for expanding the scope of § 41713 to cover all
state law whistleblower claims. 4 ' The Eighth Circuit's argument
relies on two premises: (1) Congress must have known of the
existence of § 41713 when it enacted the WPP; and (2) Congress
knew that the Supreme Court had interpreted § 41713
broadly.4 2 As the Eleventh Circuit recognized, neither of these
premises manifests a clear congressional intent regarding the
preemptive scope of the ADA, as amended by the WPP. 43 First,
Congress's knowledge of § 41713 and the Supreme Court's
broad interpretation thereof certainly does not imply that Congress intended to expand the scope of § 41713 to encompass all
state law whistleblower claims.44 In fact, Congress's knowledge
implies nothing regarding Congress's view of the scope of
§ 41713. 45 Second, if Congress is to be charged with knowledge
of the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of § 41713, it must
also be charged with the knowledge that the majority of courts
addressing the issue before the enactment of the WPP held that
state law whistleblower claims were not preempted by § 4171346
(i.e., that such claims did not ordinarily relate to the services of
37

38

Id. at 1263-64.
Id. at 1264.

- Id.
40
41

Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1264.

Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2002).
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.; see also id. at 1259-60 (citing numerous cases decided before the enactment of the WPP that held that state law whistleblower claims are not preempted
by the ADA.).
42

43
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an airline).4 7 Thus, "an equally compelling argument could be
made that Congress was indicating its acquiescence in the view
that such state law [whistleblower] claims are not pre-empted."48
Finally, as the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington noted, filing a complaint under the WPP is not
mandatory.4 9 In relevant part, the WPP simply states that "a person who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of
subsection (a) may... file ...

a complaint with the Secretary of

Labor alleging such discharge or discrimination."'50 Thus, if
Congress had intended the WPP to preempt all state law
whistleblower causes of action falling within its scope, Congress
certainly would have thought to require that those claims must
be brought in the federal courts.5
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, in Wright, should not have unconditionally relied
upon the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in holding that all, including Wright's, state law whistleblower claims falling within the
scope of the WPP are preempted. Considering the extensive
gaps in the Eighth Circuit's analysis as addressed above, the district court should have held that the ADA, as amended by the
WPP, does not preempt all state law whistleblower claims falling
within the WPP's scope. If the district court continues to ignore
the strong arguments advocated against the adoption of the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning, numerous airline employees will be
denied their right to redress under state whistleblower laws.
Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2000).
Branche, 342 F.3d at 1263 (emphasis added).
49 Fadaie v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (W.D. Wash.
2003).
50 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (b) (1)).
51 See id.
47
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